Conjecture 6.3: Skepticism Annealing
Statement
In a system of belief agents with misaligned desires, the skeptical agent (whose desire partially contradicts evidence) provides the greatest benefit during early adaptation and should be gradually removed via an annealing schedule as the system converges.
Status: Refuted
The skeptic wins always — not just early. This is a stronger result than conjectured. Rather than being a temporary exploratory mechanism, sustained skepticism acts as a permanent Bayesian regulariser (Theorem 7).
Evidence Summary
The experiment exp_skeptical_annealing.sx tested three strategies:
- Full skeptic (constant misalignment): best calibration at ALL horizons
- Annealed skeptic (gradually reduced misalignment): intermediate performance
- No skeptic (aligned desires only): worst calibration
The benefit of annealing comes not from removing the skeptic but from the diversity it introduces during the transition. The optimal strategy is to keep the skeptic permanently.
This refutation directly led to the formulation and proof of Theorem 7 (Desire as Bayesian Regulariser) and the validation of Conjecture 6.5 (Sustained Skepticism).
Relevant Experiments
exp_skeptical_annealing.sx— direct test of annealing vs sustained skepticismexp_anima_deep.sx— deep belief improvement from skeptical desireexp_anima_correlated.sx— desire regularisation across correlated streams
What This Means
This refutation strengthened the theory. The original conjecture assumed skepticism was a form of exploration that should be reduced once the system has learned enough. The reality is deeper: partial opposition is a structural advantage, not a temporary heuristic. This connects to the broader finding that adversarial regularisation improves outcomes across every domain tested (beliefs, games, GANs, learning schedules).